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Marco Paviottia, Jesper Bengtsonb
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bIT University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
Abstract
Exceptions in low-level architectures are implemented as synchronous interrupts:
upon the execution of a faulty instruction the processor jumps to a piece of code
that handles the error. Previous work has shown that assembly programs can
be written, verified and run using higher-order separation logic [14]. However,
execution of faulty instructions is then specified as either being undefined or
terminating with an error. In this paper, we study synchronous interrupts and
show their usefulness by implementing a memory allocator. This shows that it
is indeed possible to write positive specifications of programs that fault. All of
our results are mechanised in the interactive proof assistant Coq.
Keywords: Formal Verification, Separation Logic, Assembly, Coq, Exceptions,
Step-indexed models, Interactive Theorem Proving
1. Introduction
Assembly code is difficult to prove correct. When verifying imperative
programs, standard Hoare-logics often make implicit assumptions about the
control flow of programs and assume that the code c in a triple {P}c{Q} has
one entry point and one exit point, even though it may internally contain loops
and method calls. In assembly programs we cannot make this assumption as the
control flows of these languages are inherently unstructured.
Control flow is altered primarily by two mechanisms – jump commands and
interrupts. Jump commands allow developers to execute code stored nearly
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anywhere in memory; their use is an active choice, much like writing a loop or
calling a method. Interrupts, on the other hand, occur either when something has
gone catastrophically wrong (such as dividing by zero or reading from unmapped
memory) or when an action from the environment requires processing (such as
the user pressing a key, a change to the file system is made, or the processor
clock ticks).
While some aspects of interrupts might resemble those of function calls, there
are substantial differences: synchronous interrupts are not called explicitly, but
trigger as a result of a particular operation on a particular state, e.g. division
by zero. Interrupts that trigger as a result of an error are typically referred to
as synchronous, while asynchronous interrupts are external requests. Another
name for synchronous interrupts is exceptions, due to their similarity with the
exceptions encountered in languages like Java or ML, and we will use the terms
interchangeably.
We build on the existing Coq [22] formalisation of the x86 instruction set [11]
by Jensen et al. [15]. The memory model (explained in Section 3.1) is very close
to that of the actual x86 chipset – control flow is implemented using jumps
which are inherently unstructured and code is stored in memory. This allows
for self-modifying code. Secondly, their program logic [14] is able to handle non-
structured control flow through jumps in a clean and concise manner (explained
in Section 3.2).
In this paper, we present a monadic semantics and a program logic to
verify x86-assembly programs that feature synchronous interrupts. Although we
cannot ensure verified assembly can be run on real hardware as in the previous
formalisation, we are able to model synchronous interrupts very closely to the
way they run on real processors.
Whenever an interrupt fires – be it synchronous or asynchronous – the
machine jumps to a piece of code to handle the event. On x86 architectures,
the machine operates by using an Interrupt Description Table (IDT). The IDT
is stored in memory and contains, for every type of interrupt, a pointer to the
handler for that interrupt. When an interrupt is fired, the processor’s state
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is saved, the address of the interrupt handler is retrieved from the table and
the code of the handler is executed. Barring catastrophic failure, the original
processor state is then typically restored and its execution is resumed. Similarly
to how Jensen et al. store code in memory, we store the IDT and the interrupt
handlers in memory, which opens up the possibility for programs to update the
various handlers dynamically.
In this work, we initiate an exploration of the formalisation of interrupts
for assembly machines. We do this by formalising synchronous interrupts. We
believe the experience gained here gives valuable insights for extending this work
to asynchronous interrupts, and this discussed further in Section 7.
Our contributions are the following.
• We extend the semantics of Jensen et al. to support synchronous interrupts,
(Section 4.1). Jensen’s model is formalised under the assumption that the
machine runs in Protected Mode and we follow their design decisions.
• We add rules to the program logic to cover cases where synchronous
interrupts are thrown, for example when reading from unmapped memory
(Section 4.2), allowing users to verify programs that use interrupts.
• We verify a small memory allocator that uses synchronous interrupts
(Section 5). To do this, some technical, but crucial, lemmas (Section 5.1)
have been proven. (Section 5.2).
• All of our results are mechanised in Coq.
The source code for our mechanisation can be found at http://www.itu.
dk/people/mpav/downloads/coqdev.zip. The additional work with respect to
the previous development amounts to 1084 lines of code including the allocator,
which comprises 182 lines of code. The work took approximately four months.
The code is compiled with coqc version 8.4pl3 with OCaml 4.00.1.
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cmp [ESI+ 4], EDI;
jc fail ;
mov [ESI], EDI.
Figure 1: Standard Allocation mechanism
2. Memory allocation using exceptions
We use the standard AT&T syntax for assembly notation. For this example,
‘mov r, v’ stores the value v in the register r, ‘[r]’ dereferences a pointer stored in
r, ‘add r, v’ adds the value v to the value stored in the register r – if the result
to be stored in r exceeds the capacity of the register (232 − 1) the carry flag is
set. The instruction ‘jc a’ jumps to address a if the carry flag is set. Finally,
‘cmp r u’ compares the value stored in register r with the value stored in u and
sets the carry flag if the former is greater than the latter.
Jensen et al. [14] implemented and verified a simple bound-and-check memory
allocator, whose behavior and code are depicted in Figure 1. It takes three
arguments, info, n and fail, where info is a pointer to an information block of
two cells pointing to the beginning and the end of the storage respectively; n is
the number of bytes to be allocated, and fail is an address that the allocator
jumps to if n bytes are not available. The program does two comparisons – the
first checks if adding n to the memory start address causes the register value
to wrap around (by resulting in a value greater than 232 − 1) and the second
checks if that number is outside the memory available to the allocator. In both
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cases, the allocator jumps to fail if the test succeeds.
We verify an alternative version of this memory allocator using our new
semantics and program logic for exceptions, whose behaviour and code are
depicted in Figure 2. In our allocator we use the exception mechanism to jump
to a handler in case of failure, thus there are no checks for overflow or memory
bounds. Instead, we mark the end of the available memory with an unmapped
location.
The unmapped memory can be implemented via the paging system of the
Intel x86 machine, which is a mechanism to allow the machine to see more
memory than is physically available. This is implemented using a virtual address
space, namely a table with records pointing to the physical memory. A very
useful additional feature of paging is the ability to mark a single page with
security permissions. In this way, user processes can read and write only in their
own allocated space, thus implementing process isolation at the hardware-level.
An operating system can choose to set up some virtual memory for a process
and mark the end of it with a read-only memory cell. We implement an allocator
that makes use of this strategy.
Our allocator has three arguments, v1, v2 and info. The first two are double
word values to be written in the memory and the third is a pointer to the start
of the memory. Thus, we allocate two double words and write the data at the
same time. By virtue of this write to memory an exception is triggered whenever
that memory is unmapped, i.e. when the end of the memory available to the
allocator has been reached. It is then up to the interrupt handler to catch the
exception, but by jumping to the fail address it will mimic the behaviour of the
handler in Figure 1.
The reasons behind this design of the allocator are twofold. First, the memory
needs to be ‘touched’ somehow in order to trigger the exception. If we chose
not to write into the allocated space, as in Figure 1, we would allow a client
to circumvent the exception mechanism as the pointer to the next cell might
go beyond the unmapped memory region. and since this region is not touched
the allocator will succeed. Secondly, we can only allow the user to allocate a
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allocImpExp v1 v2 info , mov ESI, info; ;
mov EDI, [ESI]; ;





Figure 2: Allocation mechanism with exceptions
fixed number of cells. If we allowed an arbitrary number of cells, since this
memory region has to be initialised as mentioned above, we would need to either
generate a corresponding amount of writes into memory – which would render
the allocator less efficient w.r.t. Figure 1 – or let the user pass on the data to be
written in the store. In the latter case, the client would be already in possession
of a chunk of memory containing the source data and thus, the allocator would
be a mere memory-copy routine.
For our own purpose it suffices to allocate two cells, since this enables data
structures such as linked lists, e.g. a client can store the address of its callback
routine into the IDT and then use the allocator as a cons routine.
A variant of this allocator with any other fixed number of cells can be verified
if needed.
2.1. Interrupt mechanism
Every interrupt is identified by a unique number which is an index into a
table of pointers to the handlers. This table is commonly referred to as the
Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) and it is a chunk of memory pointed to by the
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IDT Register (IDTR) and further divided into records. Every record of the IDT
contains a pointer to an interrupt handler.
In Intel Protected mode, when segmentation is used, every address is uniquely
calculated by giving a pair of addresses called the base and offset respectively.
For example, the pair CS:EIP is the address of a piece of code with offset EIP
inside the segment indicated by the value of CS.
When an interrupt triggers, the CPU looks up the number of the interrupt,
saves the values of CS, EIP and any flags to the stack, and jumps to the
appropriate handler. In most operating systems, only one segment is used so we
chose not to worry about the segment selector – in particular the code selector –
as it would be easy to formalise if needed. The reader can safely skip this detail
as we will not use it in this paper.
While the CPU is in charge of saving the return address to the stack and
jumping to the handler, it is the responsibility of the programmer to implement
a “safe” handler, i.e. one that leaves the machine in a state from which the
original program can continue without faulting.
An interrupt handler is called transparent when it leaves no trace of its
execution in memory, i.e. the memory looks the same before and after the
interrupt fired. This kind of handler saves the CPU state by pushing all the
registers to the stack, handles the interrupt, and then restores the state as it
was before it was interrupted. Finally, it executes the IRET instruction (Return
from Interrupt). This signals the CPU to restore the triple CS:EIP and FLAGS,
thus performing a far jump back to where the program was interrupted.
The exception mechanism is slightly different in the presence of a faulty
handler. If the handler produces an error the machine raises a Double Fault
exception, which behaves the same as the other exceptions. Should this handler
fail, the whole machine reboots. This situation is called Triple Fault.
In the following section we will present the semantics of this behaviour.
However, we do make some simplifications such as avoiding mentioning seg-
ments. This is because, despite the fact that segmentation is a useful security
mechanism, in many operating systems it is not used. Segmentation is achieved
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by mapping every segment, be it code, data or stack segment, to the whole
range if physical memory. Implementors argue that the segmentation system in
the Intel’s protected mode is very expensive and thus the old paging system is
preferred. When an address is referred to inside the same segment the code is
in, the Intel specification states that we can avoid mentioning it.
3. Assembly semantics and logic
3.1. Semantics
In this section we present the Coq semantics from Jensen et al. [14]. The
semantics of the assembly language operates on a total state consisting of all
registers, flags, and memory, as follows:
S , (reg→ DWORD)×
(flag→ {true, false, undef})×
(DWORD→ (BYTE ⊎ {unmapped}))
(1)
Here, S is made of three total functions: the register state, mapping each register
to a DWORD (a 32-bit value); the flag state, mapping each flag to a boolean
value or bottom; and the memory, mapping each 32-bit address to a BYTE
(an 8-bit value), plus an unmapped value. The unmapped value stands for an
inaccessible byte of memory. For example, it can be used when the memory is
protected for some reason or inaccessible, e.g. some parts of the BIOS [11]. Let
E be the set of numbers from 0 to 255. These represent the errors that can
occur, e.g. Division By Zero, General Protection and so on.
The result of a computation is either an error in E, an unspecified behavior
or a result of type X along with the updated state:
RX , error E | unspecified | update S X
The semantics of the machine are monadic: programs are functions that
takes a state S and produce a result. The type of a computation is the following:
ST X , S→ RX
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ST is a state monad with the usual return (η : A → ST A) and bind
operations >>= : ST A → (A → ST B) → ST B. We use let x ← c;c′ for
c >>= λx.c′ and do c;c′ for c >>= λ .c′. For each field of the state, we have read
and write operations: readFlags, readReg and readMem to read the value of flags,
registers and memory locations respectively, and write operations setFlags, setReg,
setMem to write to that state. Note, the monad is defined on a general type X.
This is because we also need computations that return instructions and pointers,
as described later in this section.
The instruction set Instr is inductively defined. The interpretation function
maps an instruction instr onto an element JintrK of the monad ST unit, i.e. a
function that takes a state and returns the unit value along with the modified
state or an error. For example the interpretation of the jmp instruction is defined
as:
Jjmp iK , setReg(EIP := i)
That is, a jump instruction is a computation that updates the EIP register with
the address specified by the instruction.
The semantics of the machine make use of a step function of type ST unit
which fetches, decodes and executes an instruction as follows:
step , let eip← readReg(EIP);
let (instr, neweip)← decode(eip);
do setMem(EIP := neweip);JinstrK
where decode is a function that takes a 32-bit address and decodes the value it
contains into an instruction and the new instruction pointer, or returns an error.
If the decoding fails, the entire step-function fails with the same error.
The semantics are defined by means of a function run of type N× ST unit→
ST unit together with the step function defined above. run is defined recursively
on its first argument and takes as input a natural number n and a computation,
and executes that computation for n steps.
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3.2. Separation Logic for low-level code
In this section we give some background on the program logic we use for
reasoning about low-level code [14].
A specification for the assembly language is given in continuation-passing
style and has the following form:
⊢ (safe⊗ EIP 7→ j ∗Q⇒ safe⊗ EIP 7→ i ∗ P )⊘ i..j 7→ c (2)
which states that a program c stored in the memory between the address i and
address j is safe to run from a state P provided that there is a continuation that
runs safely from Q, where P and Q are separation logic formulas [19, 20, 18,
13, 7, 6] and safe is predicate in the specification logic. The tensor operator ⊗
takes a specification S and an assertion formula P and forms a new specification
S ⊗ P . The read-only tensor operator ⊘ has the same type as ⊗, but it is used
to compose specifications with chunks of memory that contain code that ought
not to be modified.
The ⊗ operator is an invariant extension operator in the following sense
(safe⊗P ⇒ safe⊗Q)⊘ i..j 7→ c⊗R ⊣⊢ safe⊗ (P ∗R)⇒ safe⊗ (Q∗R)⊘ i..j 7→ c
where R is the assertion that is preserved by the computation. This can be shown
by distributing R over the implication and using the rule S⊗P⊗R ⊣⊢ S⊗(P ∗R).
If c is a block, the specification in (2) can be read as a standard Hoare triple
⊢ {P}c{Q} for partial correctness.
In the assertion logic, besides the separating conjunction ∗, there are points-to
relations for registers and flags, 7_, and for the memory, 7→. As code is data,
code can be specified in the assertion logic by using the 7→ relation, e.g. i..j 7→ c
means the memory between i and j contains the program c. We are going to use
the question mark r?, where r is a register, as syntactic sugar for ∃v, r 7_ v and
similarly for the memory. Separation logic entailments are solved conveniently
within Charge! [3, 4] – a library of Coq tactics for program verification.
As an example, the mov instruction can be specified using the rule format
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(2) by instantiating as follows:
Q , r1 7_ pd ∗ pd 7→ v2 ∗ r2 7_ v2
P , r1 7_ pd ∗ pd 7→ v1 ∗ r2 7_ v2
c , mov [r1], r2
(3)
If the machine is safe to run from a state where EIP points to j, r1 is a register
containing a memory region that contains v2 and r2 is a register containing the
value v2, then the machine is safe to execute a mov instruction located at address
i with register r1 pointing to a different value.
Another example is the assembly program that sits in a tight loop forever:
⊢ safe⊗ EIP 7_ i⊘ i..j 7→ jmp i (4)
In order to prove this statement, however, we need to prove the same statement
after one step of computation, i.e. after the jump has been made. A convenient
way to express this inside the logic is to use the ⊲ modality, pronounced “later”.
To prove the statement above it suffices to prove that if it holds “later” then it
holds now. This proof technique goes under the name of Lo¨b Induction [1, 17, 5].
Finally, it is possible to compose specifications of programs in a modular way.
A program is composed by one instruction and another program as follows:
⊢ (safe⊗ EIP 7_ i1 ∗Q1 ⇒ safe⊗ EIP 7→ i ∗ P1)⊘ i..i1 7→ c1
P ⊢ P1 ∗RP
⊢ (safe⊗ EIP 7→ j ∗Q⇒ safe⊗ EIP 7_ i1 ∗Q1 ⊗RP)⊘ i1..j 7→ c1; c
⊢ (safe⊗ EIP 7→ j ∗Q⇒ safe⊗ EIP 7_ i ∗ P )⊘ i..j 7→ c1; c
(5)
The code snippet c1; c is the composition of the first instruction c1 and the rest
of the program c. In order to prove the whole program is safe to start from the
beginning with memory in P we have to prove that P satisfies the precondition
required by the first instruction c1. Secondly, we have to prove the rest of the
program is safe to execute from the part of the memory modified, namely Q1 and
part of P left untouched, namely RP . Note that the code part of the specification




As mentioned in the introduction our model differs from the x86 in terms
of a small implementation detail that means our formalisation is not runnable
on real hardware. However, we want to stay as close as possible to the original
formalisation which allowed a user to write actual x86 assembly code, verify it,
extract it as machine code and run it. To do this we chose to inherit the original
memory representation where values are encoded as vectors of booleans (lists of
a set length), representing binary numbers.
Definition BITS (n: nat) := list n bool.
here n is the length of the list. Double words are defined similarly, using the
previous definition, as a list of 32 bits:
Definition DWORD := BITS 32.
The definition of these types and their functions use modulo 2n arithmetic in
Coq. This is not suitable for points-to predicates in separation logic. Consider
the predicate p..q 7→ v for p and q of type DWORD. Assuming this predicate it
is not possible to infer that p ≤ q in arithmetic modulo 232 as p+ 4 might wrap
around. A work-around consists in defining an additional type dependent on n
that adds a top element representing the end of the memory:
Inductive Cursor (n: nat) := mkCursor (p: BITS n) | top.
A cursor is either a list of bits or the memory beyond the last representable
address.
This representation of bit values pervades the whole framework and some
challenges arise when trying to reason about points-to relations, particularly
when reasoning about lists of memory cells. We defer this issue to Section 5.1.
4. Semantics and logic for exceptions
4.1. Semantics for exceptions
We lift the semantics from Section 3.1 to model the exceptions. We do not
expect that any useful handler could throw an exception, but for the sake of
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completeness we define the semantics such that when an exception is thrown
inside a handler a double fault triggers. If this happens inside the double fault
handler the machine reboots (triple fault).
First, we define throwexp which takes as input the interrupt level and the
number of the interrupt to throw.





let new ← readMem(idt+ n ∗ 4);
setReg(EIP := new)
This routine works as follows. The semantics looks up the address of the IDT
by reading it from the IDTR and then saves the address and flags of the current
execution point – denoted by push(eip) and push(flags) – by pushing them to
the stack pointed to by ESP I˙t then fetches the address of the corresponding
exception by looking up the value of the nth record inside the IDT, and saves
this value (the address of the interrupt handler) to the EIP register.
We next define the double fault exception as a particular case of the former,
namely an exception that occurs at interrupt level 1 and that throws a double
fault exception.
doublefault , throwexp 1 ExnDF
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Finally, we define the throw function which throws the exception number n.
throw(n : nat) , let level← readRegINTL;
if (level=0) then throwexp intl n
else if(level=1) then doublefault
else halt
The above routine can be read as follows: if the INTL register is zero the machine
raises it to one and throws the corresponding exception. If the INTL register is
one, we raise a double fault exception. Otherwise, we are in the third level of
interruptions and the machine halts.
In order to catch the error and throw an exception we define a catch function
of type catch : ST unit → ST unit which takes a computation and gives a
computation such that if the former ends up in a fault it throws an exception
and otherwise returns the same result:




Whenever we have a computation c, we obtain a computation catch c of type
ST unit which turns errors into exceptions. We can then use the catch function
with the interpretation function for instructions from Section 3.1: if instr ∈ Instr
then catch(JinstrK) is the computation that throws an exception whenever the
instruction instr fails to execute.
We substitute this term in the definition of step as follows:
step , let eip← readReg(EIP);
let (instr, neweip)← decode(eip);
do setMem(EIP := neweip); catch(JinstrK)
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Note that the only difference between this step function and the one from
the previous section is in the final command where we change JinstrK to
catch(JinstrK).
Whenever the instruction just fetched from the memory raises an exception,
the machine jumps to the respective handler by updating the EIP register and
the machine continues executing from there.
We could have modified each instruction to throw an exception instead of
generating an error and then trapping it. This would result in a simpler monadic
semantics. However, our approach is essentially equivalent and it makes sure
pre-existenting code is left untouched thus remaining faithful to the previous
formalisation.
4.2. Specification logic for exceptions
In order to be able to reason about these exceptions we need assertions
describing the state of the memory in which these events can be triggered. Such
assertion allows reasoning about read and write operation to unmapped memory
regions. We define a predicate l 7→ !! that denotes the set of states such that the
location l maps to an unmapped location.
Every instruction that tries to read or write from an unmapped location now
becomes a jump into the exception handler, provided that the IDT is present in
memory.
We present the additional rule for a mov instruction that accesses an un-
mapped memory region. Thus, we make a jump-like variant of (3) using the
later-operator. The rule has the following shape:
⊢ (⊲safe⊗Q⇒ safe⊗ P )⊘ i..j 7→ mov [r1], c⊗ Inv (6)
where P is a precondition that states the code will run from a state where r1
points to an unmapped memory location and where no interrupts have occurred;
Q is the postcondition after one step, describing the state after the interrupt
triggered as a result of reading the memory pointed to by r1; and where Inv
contains the IDT table. Informally, if the machine is “later” safe to run from
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inside the handler, where the interrupt level is set to 1 and the stack pointer
points to the top of the stack where the return address j is stored, then it is safe
to run from a state where the interrupt level is zero and the stack pointer points
to a cell of memory such that the next cell is mapped.
First, the precondition must ensure that the program is starting from i with
interrupt level 0 and with the necessary space in the stack to allocate the return
address:
P , (EIP 7_ i ∗ INTL 7_ 0 ∗ ESP 7_ sp ∗ ((sp− 4)..sp)?) (7)
Secondly, we need the post-condition to assert that it is safe to jump into
the handler. Thus, at this point in time the program pointer will be the fail
address with interrupt level set to 1 and the return address on top of the stack:
Q , EIP 7_ fail ∗ INTL 7_ 1 ∗ ESP 7_ (sp− 4) ∗ (sp− 4)..sp 7→ j (8)
Finally, we need an invariant asserting that the IDT is in the memory. For
a natural number n and a 32-bit address y, we denote by IDT[n/y] the IDT in
which the nth record contains the address y. Thus, the following definition,
IDT[ExnGP/fail] stands for the IDT table where the record associated with the
general protection exception is updated with the address fail, namely, the address
to the handler. Moreover, the location l points to the unmapped region and
more precisely, the bytes from l to l + 4 (excluding l + 4 itselft) are unmapped,
while r1 points to l. Note that even though a complete IDT contains pointers to
all handlers we do not need all of them, just the pointer to the handler associated
with the general protection exception.
Inv , (r1 7_ l ∗ l..(l+4) 7→ !! ∗ IDT[ExnGP/fail ]) (9)
Any instruction that makes use of an unmapped cell turns into a jump. In
the Coq development we proved similar rules for the read version of mov and for
push and pop instructions.
We proved that the push instruction is safe to execute when the parameter
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refers to an unmapped location:
⊢ ∀i : DWORD, j : DWORD.
(⊲(safe⊗ (EIP 7_ fail ∗ INTL 7_ 1 ∗ ESP 7_ (sp−4) ∗ (sp−4)..sp 7→ j))⇒
safe⊗ (EIP 7_ i ∗ INTL 7_ 0 ∗ ESP 7_ sp ∗ (sp−4)..sp 7→ v))
⊘(i..j 7→ push[r])
⊗(r 7_ l ∗ l..(l+4) 7→ !! ∗ IDT[ExnGP/fail])
(10)
The structure of this rule is the same as in rule (6), but here we read from an
unmapped memory address and the destination is the top of the stack.
It may be worth noting that a variant of this rule where the memory pointed
to by the stack pointer is unmapped would be unsound. More precisely, whenever
the stack memory is unmapped a push instruction will generate a cascade of
exceptions that will cause the machine to reboot (Triple fault). The first exception
is triggered by the push instruction writing to the top (unmapped) stack; the
second exception is triggered by the interrupt mechanism trying to store the
address of the last executed instruction on the top of the stack (Double Fault);
and, similarly, the third exception will be generated by the interrupt mechanism
trying to handle the second exception (Triple Fault).
The pop rule, similarly, reads from the stack and puts the value in the cell
pointed to by the register r:
⊢ ∀ij : DWORD.
(⊲(safe⊗ (EIP 7_ fail ∗ INTL 7_ 1 ∗ (sp− 4)..sp 7→ j ∗ ESP 7_ (sp− 4)))
⇒ safe⊗ (EIP 7_ i ∗ INTL 7_ 0 ∗ (sp− 4)..sp 7→ spv ∗ ESP 7_ sp))
⊘(i..j 7→ (pop[r]))
⊗IDT[ExnGP/fail] ∗ r 7_ l ∗ l..(l + 4) 7→ !!
(11)
the structure of the rule is again similar to the previous ones, and again the
rule would be unsound if we tried to pop a value from a stack whose memory is
unmapped.
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5. Memory allocation using exceptions
In this section we show how to prove the memory allocator presented in
Figure 2 correct. We first show how to reason about predicates that talk about
chunks of memory with boundaries. More specifically, we need to be able to
decide whether the current cell in the memory is available or not. Secondly, we
use this result to prove the allocator correct.
5.1. The memory datatypes in Coq
As explained in Section 3.3, 32-bit binary addresses are represented by the
DWORD type. On the other hand, the points-to relation is a function from
Cursor 32× Cursor 32 to an assertion logic formula such that for all p, q of type
Cursor 32 and v of type DWORD, p..q 7→ v ⊢ p ≤ q. The type Cursor 32 is making
sure that p is actually smaller that q and that no wrap-around has occurred.
When p and q are DWORDs there is a coercion into a Cursor 32.
For convenience, many instruction rules use syntactic sugar like p 7→ v as
a notation for ∃(q : Cursor 32), p..q 7→ v. This is unfortunate as it implies that
if we had more information about q by using these rules we would lose it. For
example, assume we have a rule of the form {p 7→ } mov[p], v {p 7→ v} and that
we want to prove {p..q 7→?} mov[p], v {p..q 7→ v}. By applying the assumption
we would have to prove that {p 7→ v} entails {p..q 7→ v}, which is not provable,
unless we extract some information about q before applying the assumption.
In particular, there are two things we need to know. The first is that q was a
DWORD and that q = p+ 4, and the second is that q has not wrapped around.
In order to retrieve these two pieces of information from p..q 7→ v we need to do
some non-trivial Coq hacking.
We would like to point out that the only way to avoid this would have been
to reformulate all the assembly rules with the explicit offset as above in the
points-to relation. However, the problem arises again when the chunk of memory
is represented by list. For example, assume that p..q 7→ s where s is a list of
DWORDs. If we perform a case analysis on the list the first case is typically
s = a :: l for some a : DWORD and some list l. As a result we get that there
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exists a cursor q′ such that p..q′ 7→ a and here we get into the same trouble
again. Although this time we know q′ is not top we still need a lemma in order
to retrieve the piece of information that says that q′ = p + 4. The lemma is
stated as follows:
Lemma 1. Let p, q be two DWORDs and v a value also of type DWORD, p..q 7→
v ⊢ q = p+ 4
This lemma it is somewhat easier than recovering that q has not wrapped
around. However, it still required some non-trivial effort. The reader should note
the subtlety of this lemma. In the above, p and q are cursors that came from
a DWORD. Hence their value cannot be top. This means that the predicate
p..q 7→ v is implicitly saying that p+ 4 is not wrapping around since p and q are
cursors and that in this datatype the addresses are sequential.
All in all, our hunch for a possible solution would be to define the points-to
relation in such a way that it carries the information about what the second
cursor is and to formulate a theory about cursors that allows us abandon the
use of DWORDs.
By virtue of this effort we can now decide whether a chunk of memory is at
the end of the memory address space or not:
Lemma 2. Let base and limit be of type Cursor 32 and let buf be a list of
memory cells of type DWORD. If base..limit 7→ buf ∗ limit ..(limit +4) 7→ !! then
either
∃s1.base..(base+4) 7→ s1∗∃s2.(base+4)..limit 7→ s2∗limit ..(limit+4) 7→ !! (12)
or
base = limit (13)
Proof. The proof is by case analysis on buf . If buf is the empty list then this
implies base is equal to limit , thus satisfying (13).
If buf is composed of a cell a and a list l then there exists a p of type Cursor
such that base..p 7→ a and p..limit 7→ l. We proceed by case analysis on p. If p
is a DWORD by Lemma 1 then p is equal base + 4, thus satisfying (12). If p is
⊤ then base..⊤ 7→ a is false. Since this was an assumption the case is vacuously
true.
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5.2. Specification for the allocator
The specification for the example in Figure 2 has the following pattern,
allocSpec , ⊢ ((safe⊗Q1 ∧ safe⊗Q2)⇒ safe⊗ P )⊘ i..j 7→ c⊗ Inv
Two continuations, namely Q1 and Q2, are defined to state what happens
upon success and failure, a pre-condition P together with an invariant Inv
specifying that there exists a storage whose ends are bounded by an unmapped
memory region and that there exists an IDT containing the pointers to the
handlers.
More precisely, the precondition is defined as follows:
P , EIP 7_ i ∗ INTL 7_ 0 ∗ EDI? ∗ ESP 7_ sp ∗ (sp−4..sp)? (14)
The EIP points to the beginning of the code, INTL is the register keeping track
of the level of interruptions, EDI is a temporary register and ESP is the stack
pointer.
Upon failure the machine will jump to the handler, hence we have to ensure
that the machine will be safe to run whenever this jump will be performed. This
is expressed by the first of the two post-conditions:
Q1 , EIP 7_ fail ∗ INTL 7_ 1 ∗ EDI? ∗ ESP 7_ (sp−4) ∗ (sp−4..sp)? (15)
which states that there exists a handler which is going to take on the computation
from the address fail with the INTL set to 1 and the stack pointer containing
the return address to the original code.
Also, we make sure the machine will be safe upon success. We do this by
defining the other post-condition to be:
Q2 ,EIP 7_ j ∗ INTL 7_ 0 ∗ ESP 7_ sp ∗ ((sp−4)..sp)?∗
∃p,EDI 7_ (p+4) ∗ (p..(p+ 4))?
(16)
which states that there is a program which is safe to run from the address j
with the EDI register pointing to the end of the allocated memory and with the
interrupt level set at zero in case the allocator succeeds.
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Furthermore, we have the following invariant:
Inv , ∃base count .infoBlock 7→ base ∗ ∃s, base..count 7→ s
∗ count ..(count + 4) 7→ !! ∗ IDTR 7_ idt
∗ Flags ∗ IDT[exn.ExnGP ] 7→ fail
(17)
which states that the information block infoBlock points to a chunk of memory
bounded at the top end by the unmapped region, and the Interrupt Descriptor
Table is properly set up in the memory.
5.3. Proof of the specification
We prove the following theorem showing that implementation of the allocator
respects the specification:
Theorem 1. Let P , Q1, Q2 and Inv as respectively in (14), (15), (16) and (17).
Moreover, let c be the code in Figure 2. The specification
⊢ ((safe⊗Q1 ∧ safe⊗Q2)⇒ safe⊗ P )⊘ i..j 7→ c⊗ Inv
is sound. [Coq proof]
Proof. (Sketch). By unfolding the definition of the program there exists i1, i2, i3,
i4, i5 and i6 of type DWORD pointing at each single instruction of the program:
i..i1 7→ mov ESI, info ∗
i1..i2 7→ mov EDI, [ESI] ∗
i2..i3 7→ mov [EDI], 0 ∗
i3..i4 7→ add EDI, 4 ∗
i4..i5 7→ mov [EDI], 0 ∗
i5..i6 7→ add EDI, 4 ∗
i6..j 7→ mov [ESI],EDI
Proving the first two instructions correct is only a matter of applying the proper
rules using the composition rule (5).
First, we apply the instruction rule for the first instruction by instantiating
it with the proper parameters:
⊢safe⊗ EIP 7_ i1 ∗ ESI 7_ info ⇒ safe⊗ EIP 7_ i ∗ ESI?
⊘ i..i1 7→ mov ESI, info
For the second instruction we apply the following rule:
⊢safe⊗ (EIP 7_ i2 ∗ EDI 7_ v ∗ ESI 7_ info ∗ info 7→ base)
⇒ safe⊗ (EIP 7_ i1 ∗ EDI? ∗ ESI 7_ info ∗ info 7→ base)
⊘ i1..i2 7→ mov EDI, [ESI]
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We end up with the following precondition which we name P ′ with the
program pointer pointing to the third instruction:
P ′ = safe⊗ EIP 7_ i2 ∗ EDI 7_ base ∗ ESI 7_ info ∗ info 7→ base
∗ INTL 7_ 0 ∗ ESP 7_ sp ∗ (sp− 4)..sp 7→ spval ∗ Inv
The instruction in i2 is going to perform a write operation to the location
pointed to by base. By unfolding the invariant Inv we know there exists base
and limit of type DWORD bounding the memory:
info 7→ base ∗ base..limit 7→ s ∗ limit..(limit+ 4) 7→!! ∗ IDTR 7_ idt∗
Flags ∗ IDT[ExnGP] 7→ fail
on the other hand we do not know whether there is space left between them. So
we perform case analysis on the memory chunk by applying Lemma 2, resulting
in
base..(base + 4) 7→ s ∗ (base + 4)..limit 7→ s ∗ limit..(limit+ 4) 7→!!
∨ base = limit ∗ base..base + 4 7→ !!
This assertion is indeed part of P ′. Thus, when applying (5) we will have to
prove that P ′ implies the precondition of the instruction that we are going to
use. This means the disjunction above will appear in the negative position. So
we have to first split the disjunction into two sub cases. For the case in which
the memory has run out we will apply (6) and for the other we will apply (3).
In this case, we have that base = limit and the exception is thrown. The move
operation performs a write operation into the unmapped location. Let P ′′ be the
precondition obtained from P ′ where base = limit. We use rule (6) instantiated
as follows:
⊲(safe⊗(EIP 7_ fail ∗ INTL 7_ 1 ∗ ESP 7_ sp− 4 ∗ (sp− 4)..sp 7→ j))
⇒ safe⊗ (EIP 7_ i2 ∗ INTL 7_ 0 ∗ ESP 7_ sp ∗ (sp− 4)..sp 7→ spval)
⊘ (i2..i3 7→ (mov[EDI], 0))
⊗ (EDI 7_ limit ∗ limit..(limit+ 4) 7→ !! ∗ IDTR 7_ IDT[ExnGP] 7→ fail)
This rule can be turned into a pattern suitable for applying (5) by commuting
⊗ with ⊘ and distributing ⊗ over the implication. Note that P ′′ entails the
precondition of the instruction rule above and Q2 entails the postcondition of
the instruction rule. Hence the case is completed.
The second case is when the program goes through and it makes another
write, after which there is a successful case and an unsuccessful one. These two
cases are similar to the previous one, only that when the write is successful we




The work most closely related to ours is naturally the work by Jensen et al.
that we build on [14]. It allows specifications to be written in a clean and intuitive
manner even for code that does not follow a basic-block like structure with only
one entry and one exit point. It should be noted, however, that there are program
logics that use Hoare triples on code with multiple exit points, such as programs
containing break-statements from loops. One example is Appel’s mechanised
semantics library in Coq for C-minor [2] and the mechanisation in HOL4 of
x86 and ARM assembly by Myreen et al. [16]. Both of these mechanisations
have special postconditions that are used to handle unstructured control flow.
Other relevant work includes Chlipala’s Bedrock framework that allows assembly-
like programs to be verified in Coq [10]. Chlipala’s work focusses heavily on
automation. Its specification logic (XCAP) is an higher-order separation logic
which allows to prove properties about programs that pass around other programs
using code pointers. On the other hand, the logic and semantics do not support
code as data.
Our work has similarities with Crash Hoare Logic (CHL) [9]. In modern
operating systems, whenever a crash or a reboot occurs, a filesystem is able to
restore the data to a consistent state. CHL is a Hoare logic to prove correct
filesystems with recovery facilities of this kind. The specification logic has pre
and postconditions as in standard Hoare logic with an additional crash condition
which states that if a crash occurred the data stored on the disk is consistent.
We adopt a very similar idea in that we add an additional condition in case
an exception occurred. The advantage of having an unstructured specification
logic is that we can express the crash condition as an assertion composed with
the original postcondition by using the logical operator ∧ (and).
None of the work mentioned above currently support interrupts. Seminal
work on mechanising interrupts was made by Feng et al. [12]. They formalise
what they call an Abstract Interrupt Machine (AIM) in two layers. The first is a
machine in which programs are interrupt-aware, i.e. they have access to interrupt
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low-level instructions (e.g. sti, cli and iret). The second defines an extension
of the first by adding thread queues and extending the language with explicit
primitives for manipulating the thread queue. For the logic they employ a
rely-guarantee separation logic with preconditions only. The handler is specified
in such a way that the memory of the thread is guaranteed to be left untouched.
More recent work [8] focusses on certifying device drivers that use the interrupt
mechanism to communicate with the operating system.
On the other hand, our work focusses on handcrafted unstructured low-
level code whose semantics allow for self-modification. This presents additional
challenges as it prevents us to have more abstractions (unless we implement and
verify them on top of the existing formalisation) and automation to rely on, but
on the other hand, allows us to verify a wider class of programs.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
This is preliminary work towards formalising the interrupt mechanism which
was necessary to understand the potential of the proposed logic and ultimately
move towards the formalisation of timer handlers and schedulers in uniprocessor
machines like the Intel x86.
As a first step towards this goal, we have extended an existing mechanisation
of x86-assembly to support synchronous interrupts. By using Jensen’s model we
inherit a fairly concrete model of the Intel x86 machine to reason about mutable
code and we stay true to this design philosophy by storing the IDT and all
handlers in memory, allowing them to be dynamically updated by the processor.
Our extensions to the program logic are also very conservative. By allowing the
memory points-to predicate to state that certain memory is unmapped (and
not only what it contains), we obtain a logic that is expressive enough to verify
programs that use synchronous interrupts. In particular, our example proves
that the logic is suitable for formalising programs which generate a general
protection exception. By conservatively turning all errors into exceptions we
guarantee that sound rules in the old formalisation remain sound and that new
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rules can be added when needed to handle other kinds of exceptions with the
same pattern we used.
We believe that this is a testament not only to the validity of our design
decisions, but also of the quality of the original mechanisation.
As future work, we would like to formalise asynchronous interrupts, thus
ultimately being able to verify timer handlers, schedulers and concurrency.
However, when an interrupt fires at an unpredictable point in time it introduces
interference. This is true even for interrupts that do not share memory with
other threads. In fact, flags and registers in the model are treated as part of
the memory, and as a result, so is the stack. Indeed, there are many points
of inspiration from Feng et al.’s work, such as rely and guarantee separation
logic to ensure well-behaved handlers restore the stack and the flags correctly. A
more modular way of reasoning about shared mutable state would be that of
Svendsen and Birkedal’s work [21]. Indeed, it would be interesting to investigate
the connections of both logics with the tensor operator (⊗).
Finally, in this paper we proved the correctness of only one kind of exception,
which we deemed of most interest. We think verifying exceptions will be much
more useful once we assume concurrency – or implement it by means of a verified
scheduler as in Feng et al [12]. In particular, we could use our machinery to
verify that even if a thread throws an exception the machine continues running.
In particular, the process is killed by the operating system which then schedules
another one.
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Appendix A. Lemmas proved in Coq
This section is for review purposes only. Here, we report the contributions
we made to the Coq development.
The main example is contained in the Coq file allocexp.v: alloccases is
an auxiliary lemma, given a memory region either the cell pointed to is present
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in the memory or is unmapped; allocSpec is the specification of the allocator;















In pointsto.v we define the points-to relation for the unmapped memory. Points-
to relations for the memory are instances of the Type Class MemIs previously




Program Instance memIsUnmapped: MemIs unmap





This Coq file triple.v contains old-style Hoare Triples for reasoning inside
the instructions, in other words, to reason about micro-instructions. Since we

















Lemma elim_catch: forall P Q c,


















The Coq file instrrules.v contains the instruction rules we added in the
specification logic. We modified some of the instructions that use the specification
i..j 7→ v instead of p 7→ v.
----------------------
./coqdev/x86/instrrules.v
----------------------
Lemma evalReg_rule_catch
Lemma getReg_rule_catch
Lemma evalMemSpec_rule_catch
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Lemma PUSH_M0_rule_exp_src
Lemma MOV_MC_rule_exp
Lemma MOV_RMb_rule_exp
Lemma MOV_MV_rule_memIs
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